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Abstract:  Theresa May promised a new role for the United Kingdom in the world, dubbed “Global 
Britain.”  But what challenges arise from supposedly being more open to the world while decoupling 
from the European Union?  This article explores how much the UK can meet the expectations 
stemming from a new, unabashedly global posture.  Examining the rhetoric of British foreign policy 
since 1945 is juxtaposed against the emerging language of global openness after Brexit to illustrate 
what the UK’s partners might expect for trade, security, and global governance.  In evaluating the 
strategic benefits of using the rhetoric of globalism after EU withdrawal, this article examines the 
British state’s capacity to find the administrative resources, public expenditure, and elite consensus 
necessary to redefine the country’s position in world affairs.  While the political expediency of devising 
a new role cannot be faulted, the strategic value of “Global Britain” appears limited in light of this 
analysis.  
 
or more than 50 years, both the United Kingdom’s major political parties agreed 
on the strategic value of European Union membership to British foreign policy.  
European integration—a process various U.S. administrations wanted the UK 
to participate in—was seen as a core means by which Britain’s political and economic 
clout could be magnified.  Support for the EU was, though, hardly unwavering as 
successive UK governments, often alone among their European peers, sought to limit 
the constraints of integration on British sovereignty.  Consensus over EU membership 
unraveled completely in 2016, when Cabinet ministers such as Boris Johnson and 
Michael Gove defied the Prime Minister by leading the campaign to leave the EU. 
Their contribution—alongside the lukewarm enthusiasm for remaining of Labour 
Party leader Jeremy Corbyn—proved decisive in mobilizing a majority in support of 
Brexit.  Conscious of the fundamental realignment of the UK’s international role that 
Brexit entails, Prime Minister Theresa May proposed the term “Global Britain” in her 
first major speech on the UK’s post-Brexit posture.  In fact, Labour emulated the 
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Conservatives’ rhetoric by devoting a section of its 2017 General Election manifesto 
to articulating a vision of global Britain.  But will the UK be able to live up to this 
putative new role in world affairs?  That is, what challenges and contradictions face the 
British government now and in the future from being more open to the world while 
decoupling from the EU? 
This question naturally arises after Brexit because of “status anxiety” regarding 
the nature of the UK’s interactions with the international system.  The existing 
scholarly debate occasioned by the 2016 referendum reflects these concerns by virtue 
of its focus on billiard-ball geopolitical considerations about Brexit’s impact on 
alliances,1 as well as on what the bargaining logic of how to leave the EU implies for 
British influence in the world.2  However, the approach taken here complements such 
work by examining whether the UK can live up to the expectations stemming from 
the move to celebrate a new, unabashedly global posture. 
To assess the potential strategic success of using the rhetoric of globalism in 
a post-Brexit environment, this article scrutinizes the British state’s capacity to find the 
combination of administrative resources, public expenditure, and elite consensus 
necessary to live up to the new label the government wishes to give its foreign policy 
stance.  We first consider the rhetoric of British foreign policy since 1945 and juxtapose 
it with the emerging language of global openness after Brexit.  This process illustrates 
what change in expectations this move is likely to create among the UK’s partners for 
trade, security, and global governance.  Overall, this role-expectations approach reveals 
numerous challenges for meeting what major partners will come to expect from the 
new framing of Britain’s role in international politics.  Equally, the analysis highlights 
serious contradictions involving the language of domestic politics during and after the 
EU referendum.  It is very much at odds with the spirit of globalism.  The political 
expediency of devising a new role given the upheaval caused by leaving the EU cannot 
be faulted, but the strategic value of “Global Britain” ultimately appears limited.  
 
Brexit and Meeting the Expectations Stemming from Britain’s “Role in the 
World” 
 
Brexit marks an interruption in British foreign policy precisely because it 
jettisons the existing set of expectations surrounding Britain’s role in the world after 
World War II.  Entry into the then-European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 
was meant to assuage the long-standing status anxiety in British foreign policy which 
former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson identified a decade earlier, when he 
 
1 See, for example, Tim Oliver, “The world after Brexit: from British referendum to global 
adventure,” International Politics, Sept. 2016, pp. 689–707; and David Blagden, “Britain and the 
world after Brexit,” International Politics, Feb. 2017, pp. 1–25. 
2 See, for example, Robin Nisbett, “Preparing for the UK’s Brexit negotiations,” The World 
Today, Aug.–Sept. 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/preparing-uks-
brexit-negotiation; and Jean Pisani-Ferry, Norbert Röttgen, André Sapir, Paul Tucker and 





claimed that Britain had  “lost an empire and not yet found a role.”3  By participating 
in European integration the UK found another policy instrument to “punch above its 
weight,” alongside other features of global leadership, notably a permanent seat at the 
United Nations Security Council and a key role in North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  Indeed, the rhetorical edifice of post-imperial UK foreign policy is key to 
understanding what other countries will come to expect from an attempt to devise a 
new global role.  This is because Britain’s place in the world historically has been laden 
with clichés that have served a special function in pushing certain behaviors for fear of 
not fulfilling others’ expectations.  
Notions like the “special relationship,” which at times extends to the broader 
“anglosphere,” “little Englandism,” and “punching above our weight” are part of UK 
foreign policy rather than neutral descriptions or explanations of it.  In other words, 
since 1945 ideas like these have constituted—not merely reflected—Britain’s role in 
the world.4  More provocatively, Kenneth Waltz declared that “as Britain has declined 
in the world, Englishmen have devoted more and more attention to defining her role.”5 
Scholars of role theory in international relations similarly highlight the 
instability surrounding the strategic assumption of roles by key states.6  Yet, the 
introspective nature of assuming a certain role masks the importance that living up to 
a particular understanding of the UK’s place in the world has played in Britain’s 
domestic policy debates and international affairs. 
Of course, the UK is not unique in having a trope-filled foreign policy lexicon 
that promotes certain kinds of state behavior.  The foreign policy debate in the United 
States traditionally has revolved around the debate between “isolationism” and 
“internationalism,” together with various exceptionalist tropes such as the ‘Shining City 
upon a Hill,” and more recently “the indispensable nation.”  France meanwhile has the 
notion of “grandeur,” which echoes the imperial idea of a mission civilisatrice or 
colonization Europe too refers to “normative” or “civilian” power.  The tropic nature 
of Britain’s foreign policy language is therefore a quantitative, not qualitative, 
distinction with its international partners.   
Pointing out the prominence of clichés in UK foreign policy language is thus 
not tantamount to discounting their importance.  The idea of Britain having a 
prominent part to play on the international stage has buttressed high defense spending 
relative to other European states and a more interventionist and internationalist mind-
set on the part of policymakers.  Social roles are made up of sets of expectations about 
 
3 On the significance of Acheson’s speech, see Douglas Brinkley, “Dean Acheson and the 
‘special relationship’: the West Point speech of December 1962,” Historical Journal, Sept. 1990, 
pp. 599–608. 
4 See, David M. McCourt, “Rethinking Britain’s role in the world for a new decade: the limits 
of discursive therapy and the promise of field,” British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, May 2011, pp. 145–64. 
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 241. 
6 See, for instance, Christian Cantir and Juliete Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic 
Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Jan. 2012, pp. 5-24. 
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an individual’s—or here a nation-state’s—appropriate behavior in specific contexts.  
Importantly, such roles are mutually constituted.  They are meaningful so long as the 
parties to particular interactions behave in ways that conform to role expectations.  
Britain’s maintenance of a prominent role on the international stage in its post-imperial 
period was made possible by other states such as the United States and France, which 
supported Britain’s view of itself as an important global player through their foreign 
policies.  In doing so, they helped make the clichés of British foreign policy meaningful.  
Consider in this regard, the importance placed on the specific words that U.S. 
presidents have used at different times regarding the “special relationship” with Britain.  
UK politicians are drawn inevitably to parsing the specialness of the special 
relationship, including when praise is showered on other allies, as Britain’s global 
relevance is so crucially dependent on support from the U.S. alliance.  In the context 
of EU membership, UK policymakers specifically sought to forestall a weakening of 
the Anglo-American relationship by offering to be a transatlantic bridge between 
American and European interests.  
Hence the foremost strategic problem that Brexit poses is that it unsettles 
other countries’ expectations about the UK’s role in the world.  This is what makes 
finding a new posture so vital to the government and why Brexit analysts must evaluate 
the role-based dynamics of British foreign policy after leaving the EU.  Until the 
referendum result, Britain’s role in the world was communicated through a language 
of worldwide interests, as well as a strong diplomatic and military presence linked to 
EU membership.  Theresa May decided to reconfigure expectations about UK foreign 
policy by promoting the idea of Global Britain, even though the slogan itself is not 
new.  Gordon Brown used the concept during his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
He invoked the UK’s global outlook as the model for making the EU itself more 
globally oriented when the UK assumed the rotating Council Presidency back in 2005.7  
This forgotten episode was in keeping with the UK’s former “multipronged European 
diplomatic strategy” that consisted of treating EU relations as “a subset of its broader 
international diplomatic strategy.”8   
The ambition behind Global Britain today is just as great, if not more so, 
because the government’s overarching message is that Brexit will unlock hitherto 
untapped potential.  In particular, the UK will be able to “shape decisions across the 
globe and work to make the world a safer place as we stand up for British values and 
interests in every part of the world.”9  Boris Johnson, when setting out his agenda as 
newly-appointed Foreign Secretary in July 2016, announced a reassuring vision of 
Britain as a “great global player.”10  Brexit, Johnson noted, “did not mean Britain would 
 
7 Gordon Brown, “Global Britain, global Europe: a presidency founded on pro-European 
realism,” speech given at the Mansion House, London, June 22, 2005, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2005/press_57_05.cfm. 
8 Richard G. Whitman, “Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK’s European diplomatic 
strategy?”, International Affairs, May 2016, pp. 509–29; pp. 509-10. 
9 “Plan for Britain,” https://www.planforbritain.gov.uk/a-global-britain/, Aug. 15, 2017. 





be leaving Europe, just leaving the EU.”  Most strikingly, Theresa May spoke of the 
“opportunity ahead,” namely that of building a “truly Global Britain.  A country that 
reaches out to old friends and new allies alike. A great, global, trading nation.”11  These 
promises are intended to convince a variety of international and domestic audiences, 
and in so doing they establish a set of expectations among Britain’s key international 
partners about the future of British foreign policy. 
In keeping with the fact that role-based conduct is mutually constituted, the 
ability to fulfill a new international role is not the prerogative of the British government 
alone.  Consider the connection between trade and immigration.  In the brave new 
world of post-Brexit deal-making, the UK could sign a raft of free trade agreements 
(FTAs). (This is why Theresa May indicated at the start of withdrawal talks with the 
EU that she wanted to leave the EU customs union.)  It was more than coincidental 
that less than six months after the referendum, the Prime Minister led a major trade 
delegation to India in what was her first official visit outside Europe.  There is a 
compelling case to increase UK trade with the fastest-growing large economy in the 
world.  However, subsequent briefings from Indian officials made clear that there was 
a major obstacle to any FTA. Delhi explained that “we cannot separate free movement 
of people from the free flow of goods, services and investments.”12  This logic flies in 
the face of the UK government’s desire to cut net migration in response to the 
referendum verdict, which was strongly related to popular demands to reduce 
immigration.13  May herself as Home Secretary (2010-2016) implemented cuts to the 
number of visas for international students,14 greatly reducing the amount of Indian 
students coming to Britain, to the displeasure of the Indian government. 
Another thorny aspect of raising expectations that Brexit might allow Britain 
to play an enhanced global role is the need to avoid disappointing allies in the realm of 
security.  In her 2017 speech at Lancaster House, Theresa May indicated that security 
cooperation would remain a central pillar of UK foreign policy—a reflection, she 
claims, of the country’s “profoundly internationalist” history and culture.  But however 
welcome that internationalism is at the United Nations Security Council or NATO, the 
actual content of this international orientation remains highly unclear.  There is clear 
press hostility to the UK’s sizeable foreign aid budget as it increased during recent years 
 
11 “The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech,” 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-
exiting-the-eu-pm-speech. 
12 “UK post-Brexit trade deal with India threatened by Theresa May’s visa crackdown,” 
Independent, Jan. 18,  2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-uk-
britain-india-trade-deal-freedom-of-movement-delhi-boris-johnson-a7534026.html. 
13 See Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter, “Brexit; initial reflections,” International Affairs, Nov. 
2016, pp. 1297–1318. 
14 From a peak of more than 300,000 in 2009, the number of student visas issued was reduced 
to just under 210,00 by 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-
2015/politics-blog/11602078/Immigration-how-will-the-Conservatives-tackle-it.html. 
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of official government austerity, for example.15  More importantly, public fatigue over 
wars of choice, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, and earlier in Kosovo, suggests 
that domestic support for an interventionist Global Britain cannot be taken for 
granted.16   
The Liberal Democrat and Labour manifestos in 2017 explicitly advocated for 
orienting UK foreign policy away from military intervention.  This realization serves 
as a reminder that public backing for Britain’s various engagements during the so-called 
1990s “golden era” of humanitarian intervention was more contingent than it might 
appear.  Acquiescence was gained due to the domestic popularity of New Labour and 
its leader Tony Blair, as well as a turnaround in U.S. domestic politics that pushed a 
reluctant hegemon towards an increasingly unilateralist posture on military action for 
humanitarian ends.17  Moreover, the House of Commons refusal in 2013 to sanction 
military action against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria sets the precedent for greater 
parliamentary involvement in decisions over military intervention, and thus enhanced 
power for the public to express its own views of what Britain’s role requires in military 
terms.  
Blair and Cameron’s difficulties when seeking to provide leadership in foreign 
policy reflect the broader problem of trust in political elites that now characterizes 
British politics.  The Brexit vote itself, as well as the hung parliament produced by the 
2017 General Election, demonstrated that voters increasingly are loath to follow the 
government’s cues.  Uncertainty over public trust in elites’ foreign policy preferences 
is thus the context in which the challenges of finding a new global posture for the UK 
will occur. 
 
Challenges Facing a Global Britain Posture  
 
The principal difficulty of crafting a new foreign policy role for the UK is thus 
one of finding a language that allows the ensuing expectations to be fulfilled.  How 
friends and rivals will judge the UK is on whether it can back up assertions of a global 
posture with appropriate action.  To that end, state capacity is a crucial factor in how 
the country can develop its intended post-Brexit international relations.  Based on the 
precedent of the UK’s post-imperial posture, such capacity can be defined as a 
combination of administrative resources, public finances and elite consensus over the 
country’s position in world affairs.  
 At the administrative level, the 2016 referendum result placed the UK in 
uncharted waters.  The civil service was explicitly forbidden by then Prime Minister 
David Cameron to plan for the contingency of the UK leaving the EU even though 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) routinely plans for different electoral 
 
15 See, Simon Lightfoot, Graeme A. M. Davies and Robert Johns, “Needs and interests; 
understanding the British public’s balancing of aid priorities,” forthcoming. Preview at 
http://ncgg-new.princeton.edu/sites/ncgg/files/lightfootdaviesjohnsneedsandinterests.pdf. 
16 See Rachael Gribble, Simon Wessley, Susan Klein, David A. Alexander, Christopher 
Dandeker and Nicola T. Fear, “British public opinion after a decade of war: attitudes to Iraq 
and Afghanistan,” Politics, vol. 3: no. 2, (June 2015), pp. 128–50. 
17 McCourt, “Rethinking Britain’s role.” 
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scenarios in the case of general elections.  This decision was called “regrettable” by the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee prior to the referendum itself. In 
addition, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy labelled the lack of 
planning indicative of a “prioritization of political interests above national security.”18   
 The need to prepare for Brexit was only the beginning of the challenges facing 
Whitehall following the referendum result.  The Cabinet Secretary described the scale 
of the task as “the biggest, most complex challenges facing the civil service in our 
peacetime history.”19  The administrative personnel of the British state shrank by 20 
percent over six years after the 2010 coalition government embarked on its austerity 
cure, which also resulted in the FCO losing a quarter of its budget.20   Lacking adequate 
human resources, Chancellor Philip Hammond, in his Autumn Statement of 2016, 
earmarked up to £412m for the Department for Exiting the European Union, the 
Department for International Trade and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to 
support Brexit-related work.  Much of this funding was designed to add trade 
negotiation expertise, which is in very short supply given that since upon joining the 
EEC in 1973 the UK has relied on the European Commission for negotiating third-
country trade deals.  Indeed, a former government official claimed that in the 
immediate aftermath of the vote the UK had no trade negotiators to call upon.  
However, other departments also have a strong claim for extra resources.  The 
looming return of competences to Westminster regarding fisheries and support for 
farmers notably increased the workload at the Department for Environment, Food, 
and Rural Affairs.  Also affected is the Office for Nuclear Responsibility as the UK 
government has indicated its intention to withdraw from Euratom, the EU-wide 
system for, among other things, non-proliferation inspections.  These actions mean 
that the British government must either find a new form of cooperation with the EU 
on atomic energy or be prepared to design and implement new safeguard mechanisms 
in line with the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Yet the most 
impacted departments of state are bound to be the Home Office and HM Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC).  Immigration and customs are the areas where new rules and 
IT systems undoubtedly will need to be introduced to cover the UK’s changing web 
of international agreements.  Originally, these departments were scheduled to lose 





service/t-2015/lessons-learned-from-the-eu-referendum-16-17/,  Aug. 2017. 
19 “Capability in the civil service,” https://www.nao.org.uk/press-release/capability-in-the-
civil-service/. 
20 James Black, Alexander Hall, Kate Cox, Marta Kepe and Erik Silfversten, “Defence and 
security after Brexit: understanding the possible implications of the UK's decision to leave the 
EU—Overview report,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1786z1.html. 
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2018 the government announced an extra £1.5 billion would be spent by the EU 
departure date of March 30, 2019.21   
HMRC—the second biggest recipient of the funding announced in 2018, after 
the Home Office—is in a particular bind.  It is in the process of replacing the 25-year-
old customs declaration service with a new IT system intended to be operational from 
early 2019.  Whereas the original design brief was based on doubling the existing 
volume for declarations of non-EU goods, the whole system now needs to be upgraded 
in light of the referendum result.  This must happen to handle the estimated four-fold 
increase in declarations that would accompany the UK’s withdrawal from the EU 
Customs Union, which is a precondition for new UK FTAs.22 The quality of customs 
services in the UK is not just a domestic consideration.  A crucial component of FTAs 
is the ability to comply with rules of origin stipulations, as well as collection of duties 
and enforcement of bans on prohibited goods. All of these components depend on 
the effectiveness of customs processes, something that has been questioned in the UK 
case.  The EU’s anti-fraud agency, the Office européen de lutte antifraude (OLAF), 
investigated UK customs for “continuous negligence” in allowing textile goods from 
China into the EU without collecting an estimated €2 billion of tariff duties.  Once 
outside the single market, the UK will need to prioritize customs efficiency to deliver 
on the Prime Minister’s promise to make UK-EU trade as “frictionless as possible.”  
Hence, this area is one where the UK particularly needs to have a global reputation for 
quality in order to make the most of its new-found ability to sign FTAs.  
 The resources available for government departments to manage the transition 
to Global Britain are partially a function of the country’s fiscal position.  Brexit’s impact 
on public finances was the source of great speculation during the referendum 
campaign.  The government’s official pro-EU message was to play up the risks an EU 
exit posed to growth and prosperity, although both the Bank of England and the 
Treasury’s forecasts about immediate negative effects failed to materialize.  
Nevertheless, Brexit takes place in a context where since the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 deficit reduction remains problematic for the UK government.  Despite the 
immediate resilience of the economy, after the independent Office for Budget 
Responsibility expects the deficit to continue into the next decade even without 
assuming EU-related costs such as exit liabilities (the UK and EU agreed in late 2017 
to a mechanism for calculating these) and a slowdown in immigration. 
 Yet the relationship between spending on policy priorities and the state of 
public finances is far from deterministic.  Making Global Britain a reality implies a high 
degree of political consensus in order to commit resources come what may.  After all, 
the previous outsized UK role in the world—involving far greater defense spending 
relative to a wealthier Germany for instance—survived the end of the Cold War and 
changes of government under Conservative or Labour leaders.  Hence the chief 
difficulty relating to sustaining the spending commitments that come with an ambitious 
 
21 See Lewis Lloyd, “Whitehall steps up a Brexit gear,” blog, Institute for Government, May 
25, 2018, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/whitehall-steps-brexit-gear-spring-
statement. 
22 See “UK trade sector warns of Brexit customs disruption at borders,” Financial Times, Oct. 
24, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/3876648e-9905-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae. 
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new foreign policy agenda is actually the risk of a breakdown in political support.  The 
reason such consensus cannot be taken for granted after Brexit is that European 
integration has become a key cleavage in British politics.  Euroscepticism after 
Maastricht began life as a back-bench issue that gradually consolidated its place in the 
Conservative Party and even more so in the media, where the lack of pro-EU actors 
left the field open for hard Eurosceptic voices to dominate.  The ingrained nature of 
political opposition to the EU poses a problem even as a non-member-state because a 
host of major foreign policy issues depend on a close UK-EU working relationship.  
The most important of these are security cooperation, notably covering terrorism and 
international crime, and global trade, which will be reliant on an unknown and untested 
institutional architecture.  
 Shared interests stemming from the gains involved in cooperating in these 
areas is not a sufficient condition for the stability of an eventual agreement.  
Arrangements for maintaining information-sharing over terrorist activities and 
financing are as desirable as a close trading relationship.  Yet the details for devising 
these specific mechanisms are likely to be at the mercy of politicization on both sides 
of the new EU-UK divide.  This is not however a problem for non-institutionalized, 
military cooperation under a letter of intent such as that covering the UK-led Joint 
Expeditionary Force that builds high readiness capacity in conjunction with Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, or the 
Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force set in motion by the 2010 
Lancaster House Treaties.  These inter-governmental agreements do not bring with 
them justiciable rights or create problems of arbitration and enforcement.  
Promising a high degree of cooperation is very different from committing to 
a legally binding framework for achieving that end in other areas.  Once again, this 
issue will generate considerable work for the British civil service, There are 33 EU 
regulatory bodies and agencies for which, in the words of the House of Commons’ 
Foreign Affairs Committee, the “UK will need to be prepared to expand the capacity 
of UK regulatory bodies in the [relevant] fields and to establish new UK-only 
regulatory bodies in some cases.”23  Additionally, after Brexit, EU-UK agreements will 
fall under the framework of international law and not EU law, which covers the 
exercise of delegated powers by EU regulatory agencies.  Outside the old framework 
in which the UK could pursue judicial review via the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), legal agreements covering regulatory equivalence might fall apart if one 
party considers the other side is not meeting its obligations.  
For instance, in the field of data sharing it is the prerogative of the CJEU to 
review the legality of any EU agreement, including in the event that a third country 
changes relevant domestic legislation in a manner that undermines the original 
agreement.  In 2015 the CJEU invalidated Safe Harbor, the EU-U.S. agreement for 
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sharing commercial data, because of concerns about how U.S. companies store 
personal information about EU-based clients.  To avoid any such interference in UK 
sovereignty that is incompatible with Theresa May’s pledge to escape the jurisdiction 
of the EU’s legal system—presupposes two things.  Firstly, that the British government 
can persuade the EU to accept the adequacy of UK data gathering protocols, which 
could be re-evaluated as a result of legislative change from one side or the other and, 
secondly, that European leaders are willing to accept an alternative form of dispute 
resolution bypassing the CJEU.  Such adaptation to UK preferences is at odds with 
May’s own depiction of the EU as “bend[ing] towards uniformity, not flexibility.”24 
Consequently, forging political agreement with Brussels will be a recurring 
topic in British politics.  Political parties and their MPs are not going to be able to 
forget about the EU after Article 50 negotiations are concluded.  Instead, unleashing 
the potential of Global Britain is contingent in many ways on the goodwill of European 
partners.  This form of post-Brexit dependency is most evident in the field of trade 
relations.  From the perspective of Global Britain, the EU is in theory just one among 
multiple partners with which to have as open a trading relationship as possible.  In 
practice, the first step towards making the UK a more globally-oriented champion of 
free trade is an agreement (again assuming a departure from the Customs Union) over 
parceling out World Trade Organization (WTO) schedules that currently cover the EU 
as a whole.  Here, EU cooperation would make this change a much smoother process 
and minimize the likelihood of compensation claims by third countries.  
As Brexit becomes a reality, UK-EU relations in numerous policy domains are 
bound to be re-evaluated as a result of legislative change from one side or the other.  
The EU negotiator and former European Commissioner Michel Barnier has talked 
about the need to prepare for the problem of “regulatory divergence.”25  This term is 
a reference to the fact that treaties or other legal instruments that provide for 
frictionless trade based on mutual recognition of regulatory regimes in areas such as 
financial regulation, civil aviation, chemicals manufacturing, or environmental 
standards could in theory be repudiated unilaterally by either party.  An arbitration 
mechanism, as outlined in the government’s 2017 Brexit White Paper, could well be 
created to avoid such a disruptive outcome, but the existence of such a system 
necessarily limits the UK’s ability to regain full sovereignty over these areas of 
regulatory decision-making. 
Moreover, arbitration cannot remove the economic power differential 
between the two sides.  The EU-27 have a combined GDP six times that of the UK, 
which provides leverage if Brussels wanted to bypass or ignore arbitration.  A case in 
point is the EU’s reaction to the Swiss referendum in 2014 on restricting free 
movement rights of EU nationals.  Switzerland’s unilateral repudiation of one of the 
legal bases for access to the single market resulted in the European Commission 
 
24 Theresa May, “The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU,” Speech delivered 
at Lancaster House, Jan. 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-
negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech. 
25  See Michel Barnier, “The conditions for reaching an agreement in the negotiations with the 
United Kingdom,” speech at the plenary session of the European Committee of the Regions, 
Brussels, March 22, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-723_en.htm. 
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suspending Swiss participation in EU research and education projects.26  This move 
immediately forced policymakers in Bern to rethink introducing quantitative limits on 
EU migrants. 
 Enacting Brexit in UK law is the domain of the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Act that first came before parliament in 2017.  This piece of legislation transposes all 
EU law into domestic legislation, but at the same time gives Parliament the ability to 
rework rules that formerly only could have been changed via EU legislation.  A key 
challenge when Parliament debates or enacts such reforms after EU withdrawal (and 
any transition or standstill period where EU law would still apply) is their impact on 
regulatory equivalence with Brussels.  In other words, the political cleavage over 
European integration will morph from the overarching, binary In/Out referendum 
debate to an underlying, if episodic, question of whether UK legislation needs to take 
account of EU preferences.  Since Brexit was premised on the need or desire for the 
UK to decide for itself on a range of policies, Eurosceptics in Parliament and in the 
media will no doubt rail against continued EU interference.  Only a strong political 
consensus can prevent the Global Britain agenda from being checked at times by such 
forces of residual EU opposition.  However, the contradictions inherent in promoting 
Brexit militate against such consensus. 
 
The Inherent Contradictions between Brexit and Global Britain 
 
In her first major speech as Prime Minister on how to approach the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU, Theresa May made a point of addressing the issues of 
belonging and identity that proved so emotive during the referendum.  She did so in 
part by declaring that “if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of 
nowhere.”27  Her comment demonstrated the way the campaign had been defined by 
many voters in terms of an exclusive British identity and associated preference for self-
rule, which necessarily rejected free movement of people or shared sovereignty with 
Brussels.   This desire to regain control of important policy levers to serve British 
interests better is the political lodestar of May’s Brexit strategy. Yet the pull of this 
exclusionary sentiment is fundamentally at odds with the Global Britain message about 
openness and engagement with a plethora of international partners. 
This incompatibility is already a domestic problem in light of the multinational 
composition of the British state.  The constitutional bricolage holding together 
devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales alongside the 
Westminster Parliament was intended to reconcile overlapping political identities. 
After 1997, Prime Minister Tony Blair devolved power away from Westminster in 
recognition of the multiple definitions of who the people are within the UK.  But this 
ad hoc arrangement might have reached the limits of its usefulness following the EU 
referendum.  This is because the result foists an English (and Welsh) constitutional 
 
26  See Andrew Glencross, “Why a British referendum on EU membership will not solve the 
Europe question,” International Affairs, March 2015, pp. 303–317. 
27 May, Lancaster House speech. 
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preference upon Scotland and Northern Ireland.  The non-English parts of the UK 
that voted to remain in the EU face an ongoing struggle to come to terms with the 
basic issue of whether Westminster can continue to speak on their behalf to the outside 
world.  Anticipating this dilemma, Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, prior to 
the referendum had called for each devolved legislature to have a veto on an English-
majority vote to leave the EU. 
 
 
UK Prime Minister Theresa May 
 
If the double-helix of Scottish and British exceptionalism unravels because of 
a successful independence referendum in Scotland, the damage to the Global Britain 
agenda would be considerable.  As a historically anti-nuclear party, the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) has long vituperated against the stationing of the UK’s nuclear 
deterrent on the River Clyde.  The White Paper on Scotland’s Future prepared by the 
SNP government before the 2014 referendum contained a pledge to negotiate for 
removing UK nuclear weapons in the event of independence.  However, the options 
for relocating both the submarine base and the nearby warhead storage and loading 
facility are extremely limited.  The costs of doing so have been estimated in a paper for 
the Royal United Services Institute at “£2.5 and £3.5 billion, not including the 
additional costs involved in land acquisition and clearance.”28 The implications for the 
 
28 Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers, “Relocation, relocation, relocation: could the UK’s 
nuclear force be removed after Scottish independence?” occasional paper, Royal United 
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public purse are relatively slim compared with the sums required to upgrade the nuclear 
deterrent for future decades.  Shortly after the referendum, the House of Commons 
passed a motion supporting the construction of four Dreadnought-class submarines 
to maintain the deterrent at an estimated capital cost of £31billion. However, the 
inevitable politicization of the UK’s atomic warfare capability that would follow its 
relocation from Scotland could undermine public support for Trident’s successor. The 
need to establish new nuclear-capable facilities within a more densely-populated 
England would serve to highlight the spending commitments at stake and add 
environmental objections to the equation. Any delays in establishing equivalent 
facilities to those used in Scotland would inevitably adversely affect the international 
credibility of the deterrent. 
Beyond the strategic implications, a disunited kingdom flies in the face of 
Theresa May’s invocation of a state “respected around the world and strong, confident 
and united at home.”29  The significant diaspora of Britons, which former Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson noted is larger than in any corresponding developed country, 
has a large contingent of Scottish descent. In the event of Scottish independence, 
therefore, another state would have a rival claim to a significant amount of the British 
diaspora members.  The instrumentalization of expatriates for commercial or cultural 
exchanges would in this scenario become a zero-sum game as both states jostled for 
their allegiance.  It is easy to imagine a competing ‘Global Scotland’ initiative for which 
Westminster would have to contend. Indeed, Brexit laid bare the torn identity many 
UK voters wrestle with and which could easily become more polarized if there is no 
longer an overlapping British framework of political identity.  For while polls 
conducted six months after the referendum revealed a majority of UK voters support 
the union with Scotland, they also indicated that a majority believed Brexit should 
happen even at the cost of a break-up of the UK.30  The same logic also applies to 
Northern Ireland, as polls show a strong majority in the rest of the UK among those 
who favor Brexit not to compromise autonomy on customs or trade rules for the sake 
of minimizing border friction with Ireland.31  
The cracks in Britain’s constitutional edifice are compounded by the strain 
Brexit has placed on the stability of the UK’s political economy.  This is not to say that 
the EU as a whole is a bastion of stability in this regard; on the contrary, the creation 
of the Euro amplified the crisis of neoliberalism on the continent as illustrated by the 
rise of populist Eurosceptic parties such as the Front National in France or M5S in 
Italy.  However, having stayed aloof from pooled sovereignty in monetary policy, the 
 
Services Institute, Aug. 2014, p. 13, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/
201408_op_relocation_relocation_relocation.pdf. 
29  May, Lancaster House speech. 
30 “Brexit more important than keeping the UK together, public say in poll for the 
Telegraph,” Telegraph, March 17, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2017/03/17/brexit-important-keeping-uk-together-public-say-poll-telegraph/. 
31 Michael Ashcroft, “Leave voters would rather lose Northern Ireland than give up benefits 
of Brexit,” The Telegraph, June 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/06/19/
leave-voters-would-rather-lose-northern-ireland-give-benefits/. 
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UK consensus since the Maastricht Treaty was to profit from the single market while 
trying to stymie over-regulation of financial services provided by the City of London.  
Cameron’s renegotiation, in fact, underscored the pursuit of this goal as the UK 
government succeeded in securing legal protection for countries not in the single 
currency or participating in the new banking union to keep their own rules for 
supervision of the financial sector.32  There was also a formal agreement that countries 
outside the Eurozone would not be obliged to contribute to bailouts.  
Brexit thus shattered the pro-EU-but-anti-Euro accommodation between 
business and politics, leaving the future of the country’s political economy open to 
question.  Indeed, the Leave campaign’s economic argument against EU membership 
was in many ways the culmination of the gradual construction of what has been dubbed 
“a Eurosceptic political economy,” 33  distinguishing the UK from the continent.  The 
profound rupture this entails with the economic orthodoxy of the Blair and Cameron 
years is reflected by George Osborne’s comment, after his departure as Chancellor, 
that “the government has chosen—and I respect this decision—not to make the 
economy the priority.”34  Outside the single market, there are certainly two options 
that can potentially compete with the former consensus and which chime with the 
founding Brexit mantra of taking back control.  The first involves pursuing a radical 
pro-business agenda based on cutting regulatory standards and corporate tax rates.  
Osborne’s replacement, Philip Hammond, fired a warning shot to the EU about the 
structural pressure to follow such a course in the event of having no satisfactory trade 
agreement after Brexit: “In this case, we could be forced to change our economic 
model and we will have to change our model to regain competitiveness.  And you can 
be sure we will do whatever we have to do.”35  The other alternative—more associated, 
but not exclusively so, with the Labour Party of Jeremy Corbyn—is for a revived 
Keynesian-inspired industrial policy.  This strategy would become attractive if an EU-
UK FTA did not include provisions for curbing state aid.  The European Council’s 
negotiating brief expresses the desire for trade relations with the UK to be based on 
safeguards against unfair competition.  However, recent precedents send a mixed 
message on this topic: the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) does not cover the grant of subsidies, which was also true of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, while the EU-
Ukraine FTA does require a domestic and independent system of state aid control 
from Kiev. 
Pursuing either option would be hard to reconcile with Global Britain’s stated 
aims and would thus risk isolating the UK among its peer group of developed 
 
32 Andrew Glencross, David Cameron’s Great Miscalculation: Why the UK Voted for Brexit 
(Basinstoke: Palgrave, 2016). 
33 Chris Gifford, “The United Kingdom’s Eurosceptic Political Economy,” British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, vol. 18: no. 4, (2016), pp. 779-794. 
34 “George Osborne: Brexit plans do not prioritise the economy,” The Guardian, Feb. 1, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/01/george-osborne-uk-brexit-plans-do-
not-prioritise-the-economy. 
35 “Brexit: UK could ‘change economic model’ if single market access denied,” BBC News, Jan. 




countries.  Protecting industries from outside competition is inimical to a serious free 
trade agenda.  The consequences here include the possibility of retaliation from larger 
economic powers using the WTO dispute resolution mechanism and delays in 
replicating trade deals with third countries (e.g. South Korea or Canada) that used to 
cover the UK as an EU member state.  Abandoning reciprocal state aid controls when 
trading with the EU could also allow the latter to distort trade to the detriment of UK 
exports to its largest market.  A doubling down on neoliberalism, however attractive 
for certain powerful economic interests such as the hedge fund backers of the Leave 
campaign, would put the UK on a collision course with the EU.  Any profound de-
regulation of finance, environmental, and labor standards would undermine the 
stability of regulatory equivalence agreements and potentially encourage EU 
protectionism vis-à-vis the UK.  
The probability that Brexit could alter the EU’s attitude to global trade 
regardless of what economic policies are implemented in the UK is already far from 
trivial. Both Labour and Conservative governments sought to uphold free trade 
principles within the EU, notably by stymying efforts to protect against Chinese 
imports in sectors such as steel. In the absence of a UK presence at the decision-
making table, EU trade and regulation policy are more likely to take into account the 
protectionist instincts of French governments of both left and right. Whichever model 
of political economy takes root in the UK after Brexit, leaving the EU will have 
negative repercussions for the EU’s openness to international trade at a time when 
populist parties have put protectionism back on the political agenda in the West. 
Historically, free trade was a key component of the integration of UK global and 
European diplomacy as EU membership was a highly efficient way to advocate for 
reducing trade barriers.  Consequently, the benefits of Global Britain’s ability to carry 
the torch for free trade might be outweighed by the costs of a subsequent recalibration 
of EU trade policy.  
 
Conclusion: Anti-Globalism and Brexit 
 
Uncertainty over which path the UK economy will take, as well as what the 
EU’s response will consist of, points to the final and perhaps most fundamental 
contradiction inherent in Brexit.  That is, the forces that helped persuade voters in the 
UK to leave the EU include a virulent anti-globalist sentiment that is further associated 
with low confidence in elites.  The strong preference of Londoners to stay in the EU 
contrasts with the core Northern English and Welsh vote to leave, mirroring the 
structural divide between cosmopolitan, metropolitan liberals and globalization’s left-
behinds in the provinces.  These tendencies are by no means confined to the UK, as 
evidenced by the election of Donald J. Trump or opposition within the EU to TTIP 
and CETA.  As Henry Kissinger reflected after the referendum, “The impact of the 
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British vote is so profound because the emotions it reflects are not confined to Britain 
or even Europe.” 36 
Yet the predicament for the UK’s future global role is that the EU 
membership referendum exacerbated this particular form of polarization.  UK foreign 
policy elites are tasked with making a series of new trade deals, security treaties, and 
immigration arrangements.  This workload and its saliency have increased 
tremendously at a time of sedimented mistrust of politicians and associated experts 
vaunting the merits of globalization.  Each deal under discussion thus faces running 
the gauntlet of anti-globalism; there will be constant scrutiny over whether a treaty is 
compatible with preserving British sovereignty and enhancing national interests.  After 
all, the ability to deliver Brexit without compromising these principles is exactly what 
the UK government—taking its cue from the campaign to leave the EU—has 
promised.  That leaves any coherent foreign policy a hostage to fortune, but especially 
one that is explicitly framed around globalism and an openness to the world.  
The objective behind this article’s role-based analysis of UK foreign policy 
after Brexit was to look beyond geopolitics or bargaining outcomes and focus instead 
on what it would take to live up to the rhetoric of Global Britain.  This undertaking 
involved showing the political power of language in terms of how crucial tropes have 
been to post-war UK international commitments by providing a certain self-image that 
underpins numerous policies and practices.  Now that a new role needs to be 
fashioned, the accompanying policies that could make Global Britain a reality accepted 
by key international partners were also scrutinized.  This approach demonstrates that 
global engagement without compromising sovereignty or accommodating 
other national interests is a posture built on an oxymoron.  Seen in this 
light, Global Britain is a patently unstable role to assume as it will either 




36 Henry Kissinger, “Out of the Brexit turmoil: opportunity,” Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2016, 
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